

**DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, RIVERSIDE**

Graduate course and seminars for 2011-12

Fall Quarter

PHIL 124: Intermediate Logic, Michael Nelson – Tuesday/Thursday 11AM – 12:30 PM

PHIL 275A [Proseminar], Erich Reck – Friday 3:10 - 6 PM

Frege and Modern Logic. We will consider the significance of the revolution in logic often associated with Frege. This will involve seeing Frege's contributions in relation both to earlier thinkers, especially Aristotle and Kant, and to later thinkers, such as Tarski. It will also involve considering how Frege's novel conception of logic is tied to his understanding of the notions of concept, object, meaning, and truth. Along the way, we will get a sense of why questions about logic were and still are central to philosophy. The focus will be on philosophical aspects, not mathematical techniques and results.

PHIL 282 (01), Michael Nelson – Tuesday 12:40 – 3:30 PM

Constructivism in Moral Theory: Some claim that moral constructivism offers a promising compromise between various forms of anti-realism that view purported moral judgments as nothing but the expression of emotion, for example, and robust realist views that see moral judgment as concerning aspects of reality constituted independently of human activity and decisions. The moral constructivist sees moral reality as being constructed, being in some sense dependent on what a rational and reasonable agent would choose and in this way dependent upon the activity of reason. This course aims to get a sharper focus of the different varieties of constructivist theses and, through reading recent articles both defending and criticizing constructivism, evaluate their plausibility. [V]

PHIL 282 (02), Andrews Reath – Thursday 12:40 – 3:30 PM

Kant's Normative Theory: the topic of the seminar will be the normative, as opposed to the foundational, component of Kant's moral theory – the categorical imperative and Kant's account of moral judgment and deliberation. Readings will include selections from the *Groundwork* and second *Critique*, the *Metaphysics of Morals* (both the *Doctrine of Right* and the *Doctrine of Virtue*), and the secondary literature that has tried to develop a picture of Kantian moral reasoning. [V, H]

PHIL 282 (03), Pierre Keller – Wednesday 12:10 – 3 PM

The seminar will develop a reading of Kant's critical philosophy according to which the structure of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (but also of his other Critiques) is inherently systematic. The systematic structure of the Critique, it will be shown, is based on a system of ideas. It will be argued that the idea of a whole of cognition underlies the systematic structure of the argument in the Transcendental Analytic, as well as the Transcendental Dialectic and Methodology. Ideas, it will be argued, are for Kant,

following Plato, entities that are intrinsically normative. They provide standards for activities in which we engage. Ideas, it will also be argued, are as such at the basis not only of all logic, of all science and of all morality, but of all philosophy. The relation that ideas have to a possible self-conscious point of view is the basis for all thought as Kant understands it. Kant refers to this possible self-conscious point of view as the original synthetic unity of apperception. It will be argued that representations of all kinds are for Kant differences in a systematic pattern constituted by ideas and related in a differential way to the original synthetic unity of apperception. These differences are ultimately differences that the representations can make in what we do. The context of experience is for Kant the context in which the notion of truth has significance. The comprehensive way in which we articulate experience to ourselves is through an idea of the whole of experience. This idea goes beyond all possible experience and encourages us to think that truth must lie in the idea. Kant argues however that ideas are illusory when they are taken to be objects of theoretical knowledge in their own right. To take ideas to be objects that we grasp through what Plato calls nous and Kant calls intellectual intuition is an illusion to which we are necessarily prone due to the role that ideas play in giving structure to cognition. This illusion is at the root of much of the failure of traditional metaphysics to become a science. For those of you interested in post-Kantian German idealism, it will be shown that post-Kantian idealism in general, but Hegel's philosophy in particular is an attempt to carry through Kant's program of a system of ideas as a system of metaphysics. Fichte, Hölderlin, Schelling, and Hegel reject Kant's argument that the notion of an intellectual intuition or intuitive intellect can play only a contrastive role to our kind of intellect. This allows them to push Kant's position past the distinctions upon which its nature as a critical philosophy depends. Schelling and Hegel develop Kant's arguments for the systematicity of ideas to argue for the kind of platonic idealism that Kant juxtaposes to his own critical idealism. [H]

Winter Quarter

PHIL 275B [Proseminar], John Fischer – An introduction to classic contemporary work on central issues in agency theory, in particular, free will and moral responsibility. Topics include the Consequence Argument, P.F. Strawson, Gary Watson, Frankfurt-cases, hierarchical theory, event-causal libertarianism, and agent-causal libertarianism.

PHIL 282 John Perry – The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell

This seminar will try to understand Russell's book *The Problems of Philosophy* (1912) quite thoroughly, and using that as a base, try to understand important aspects of his earlier work ('On Denoting', *Principia Mathematica*), the next stage of his thinking (*Our Knowledge of the External World*, e.g.) and some of his last systematic philosophy (*Human Knowledge*). [E&M]

PHIL 283 (01), Peter Graham – Virtue Epistemology: This seminar will address recent work in virtue epistemology, with a focus on virtue reliabilism, as advanced by Sosa, Plantinga, Greco, and others. We shall explore the general structure of virtue reliabilist accounts of warrant. I shall then develop and advance my own account of warrant as

consisting in the normal functioning of a belief-forming process when the process has forming true beliefs reliably as an etiological function. The seminar will thus also address recent issues in the philosophy of biology and psychology. [E&M]

PHIL 283 (03), Eric Schwitzgebel – Philosophy of Psychology [E&M]

PHIL 283 (02), Coleen Macnamara – Holding responsible (tentative) [V]

Spring Quarter

PHIL 275C [Proseminar], John Perry –

PHIL 282 (01), Maudemarie Clark – Nietzsche on Morality [V, H]

PHIL 282 (02), Josef Müller – Aristotle's Moral Psychology [H]

A close reading of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

PHIL 283 (01), Agnieszka Jaworska – Caring and Practical Reasoning: What is it to care about something? How is caring related to desiring? To the emotions? To having policies? What is the relation between caring and the will? Do we have reasons for caring about things? Do we have reason to pursue what we care about? Can attention to caring help explain the phenomenon of “silencing” reasons? Readings from contemporary literature, including some or all of the following: Frankfurt, Watson, Bratman, Scanlon, Raz, Williams, Helm, Seidman, Kolodny. [V]

Phil 283, Howard Wettstein: Philosophy of Religion