GRADUATE SEMINARS 2016-17

SPRING 2017

Phil275: Proseminar – Reck (Varieties of Analysis)

In this proseminar we will compare several notions of analysis as they have played a role in the analytic tradition, together with some paradigmatic examples of their application. This includes the stereotypical procedure of identifying necessary and sufficient conditions for a concept, sometimes misleadingly identified with “analysis” in general, but also Carnapian explication and Strawsonian connective analysis, among others. The readings will include several classic texts by Frege, Russell, Tarski, Carnap, Quine, and Strawson, as well as more recent secondary literature on these texts and on the general topic of analysis.

Phil280: Seminar – Muller (Aristotle on Agency)

The course will concentrate on Aristotle’s account of both human and animal agency. Topics will include human/animal nature, human/animal cognition (including practical thought), responsibility, and akrasia. Readings will include selections from Nicomachean Ethics/ Eudemonic Ethics (esp. EE 2, NE 3, 6, 7), De Anima, De Motu Animalium, and others.

Phil281: Seminar – Clark (Nietzsche)

Phil283-002: Seminar – Jaworska (Margins of Agency)

What can we learn about foundational issues and concepts in moral theory and moral psychology (autonomy, valuing, reasons for action, moral responsibility, etc.) by studying cases of "agency at the margins:" for example, addiction, Alzheimer's disease, lesions in the prefrontal cortex, frontotemporal dementia, psychopathy, early childhood? Readings from contemporary literature.

Phil283-001: Seminar – Nelson (Particulars)

What is an individual thing, a particular person, cat, tree, house, or rock? Is individuality basic and primitive, or is it instead to be analyzed in general terms? Are individuals just, say, bundles of co-instantiated properties, or is individuality at the metaphysical ground floor? And, assuming the latter, what are the basic individuals, are they just mental particulars (Russellian sense-data), spacetime points, space and time being the only fundamental particulars in reality, or concrete particulars, and, if the last, are the only fundamental concrete particulars atomic or are medium-sized dry goods, like people, cats, trees, and houses, also genuine particulars? The seminar will begin with these classical metaphysical issues, where we will look at arguments for and against the bundle theory of individuals and "bare particulars," also asking about the relationship between a particular and its characterizing essence, or its definition that answers what the thing is, the thesis of the identity of indiscernibles and Max Black’s famous counterexample to that thesis, and other related topics. We will then face the same issue but from a different direction, by asking about the nature of singularity in thought; that is, in virtue of what is a thought about a particular object in the world. We will read part 1 of Strawson’s Individuals, following with discussions on the nature of demonstrative thought and self-thought influenced by
Strawson, in particular the Oxford group of Gareth Evans, (the early) John McDowell, (the early) Christopher Peacocke, and John Campbell.