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“Hinge Disagreement”

May 8, 2019 @ 3:00 pm - 5:00 pm

“Hinge Disagreement”

By: Annalisa Coliva (UC Irvine)

Abstract: How is it possible to make sense of disagreement between people holding different and incompatible “hinges” – that is, basic propositions that make the acquisition of evidence possible in the first place? On certain versions of hinge epistemology, it is not possible at all (call this “the lost disagreement problem”). Moreover, should people endorse different hinges, it would not be possible rationally to resolve the situation in favor of one or the other party (call this “the problem of rational inertia”). In the light of the kind of hinge epistemology defended in my book Extended Rationality. A Hinge Epistemology, and of the constitutivist account of hinges’ rationality proposed therein, I argue that we can recover the possibility of disagreement. Moreover,  that the disagreement with a certain kind of Human skeptic is conceptual and rationally resolvable.



May 8, 2019
3:00 pm - 5:00 pm


HMNSS 1500