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June 2018

End of Year Party

June 11, 2018 @ 5:00 pm - 8:00 pm
TBD
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September 2018

Philosophy Orientation

September 20, 2018 @ 12:00 pm - 3:00 pm
INTS 1109

For additional information on the philosophy orientation, feel free to contact Perla Fabelo (perla.fableo@ucr.edu) or Christy Gray (christy.gray@ucr.edu).

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October 2018

Colloquium – Pierre Keller (UCR)

October 10, 2018 @ 3:40 pm - 5:00 pm
HMNSS 1500

Professor Keller's talk will be center on: "The Structural Dynamics of Reason in the Copernican Revolution."   For more information on Pierre Keller, click here. 

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Colloquium – William Blattner (Georgetown)

October 24, 2018 @ 3:00 pm - 5:00 pm
HMNSS 1500

"A New Approach to Heidegger’s Conception of Originary Temporality" Abstract: In this paper, I return to the theme of Heidegger’s conception of originary temporality. I say “return,” because I began my professional career working on this idea and its implications for other aspects of Heidegger’s early thought. In the almost twenty years since I published Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism, I have come around to a new way of thinking about Heidegger’s account. This new approach takes its clue from the linguistic…

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November 2018

Colloquium – Jonathan Weinberg (University of Arizona)

November 14, 2018 @ 3:00 pm - 5:00 pm
HMNSS 1500

“Off Base: The Case Against Epistemic Basing Relations” Epistemologists typically take it as a given that it’s not enough for an epistemically successful agent merely to possess some evidence E for their belief that P — their belief that P must also, in some substantive way, be based upon E. I will argue against this theoretical presupposition in epistemology, and for there are no such substantive basing relations to be found on or among our beliefs. First, our ordinary epistemic…

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Cancelled: Charles Mills (The Graduate Center, City University of NY)

November 28, 2018 @ 3:00 pm - 5:00 pm
HMNSS 1500

Unfortunately, the Charles Mills colloquium today, 11/28, has been cancelled. He was trapped in Chicago due to the blizzard; both his initial flight and his make-up flight were canceled, and he was not able to reschedule another to allow him to make it here in time for the talk. Apologies for the last-minute change and to everyone who was excited to have him here this week.

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January 2019

Colloquium – Peter Epstein (University of Cambridge)

January 25, 2019 @ 3:00 pm - 5:00 pm
HMNSS 1500

Spatial Experience: More Than a Mere Structure Led by Peter Epstein Pembroke College, University of Cambridge According to a widely-held view of spatial experience known as structuralism, perceptual representations of spatial features are merely structurally isomorphic to abstract Euclidean geometry; their contents do not include substantive Euclidean concepts. I show that this structuralist view fails to explain the way in which we apply our Euclidean concepts to the spatial features we perceive. For, on the structuralist picture, the results of Euclidean geometry…

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Colloquium – Sara Aronowitz (Princeton University)

January 28, 2019 @ 3:00 pm - 5:00 pm
HMNSS 1500

Exploring by Believing Led by Sara Aronowitz Princeton University Abstract: Sometimes, we face choices between actions most likely to lead to valuable outcomes, and actions which put us in a better position to learn. These choices exemplify what is called the exploration/exploitation trade-off. In computer science and statistics, this trade-off has fruitfully been applied to modulating the way agents make choices over time. In this talk, I'll argue that the trade-off also extends to belief. We can be torn between two ways…

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February 2019

Colloquium – Karina Vold (Cambridge)

February 1, 2019 @ 3:00 pm - 5:00 pm
HMNSS 1500

Can Consciousness Extend? Led by Karina Vold University of Cambridge Abstract: While Andy Clark and David Chalmers (1998) argue that certain mental states and processes can ‘extend’ to be partially constituted by objects located beyond one’s brain and body, they deny that phenomenally conscious states can extend. Chalmers (forthcoming) argues (a) that consciousness requires direct availability for global control, and (b) that cognition must be extended in a certain way, namely, via perception and action. The conjunction of these claims, he…

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Sasha Newton (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champagne)

February 13, 2019 @ 3:00 pm - 4:30 pm
INTS 1111

“The Moral Law is Not Originally the Law of a Species” Abstract: It is often thought that whereas Kant’s theoretical philosophy is concerned with being, or with what is, in the most general sense, practical philosophy is concerned with a region of being – namely, with our being as practical and moral agents. Theoretical philosophy studies the most fundamental, universal principles and laws of what is. Practical philosophy, by contrast, turns to the moral law, understood as the normative law governing a kind…

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