

**DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, RIVERSIDE**

Graduate course and seminars for 2012-13

Fall Quarter

PHIL 275, Andrews Reath – First Year Proseminar in Value Theory [Tuesday, 3-6 PM]

The seminar will survey some central issues in contemporary moral theory. We will begin with various questions about the nature of reasons for action: what do we mean by a reason for action? what is the connection between reasons and desires or motives? The balance of the seminar will survey (all too briefly, I am afraid) some of the main currents in contemporary normative theory – deontological intuitionism, consequentialism, contractualism, contemporary Kantianism, and virtue theory.

PHIL282 (02), Pierre Keller – Kant's Copernican Revolution and the cosmopolitan conception of philosophy [Thursday, 3:40 – 6:30 PM]

I am planning to do something on Kant's Copernican Revolution and what he calls the world or cosmopolitan conception of philosophy. This is philosophy as it addresses what is of necessary interest to everyone. Part of what I want to do is to set up Kant's Critique as a critical reflection on what it is to engage in the philosophical endeavor. I think that the Critique needs to be read from back to front as well as from front to back; this is because the Critique involves an account of how higher forms of unity connected with our ends and interests emerge out of our direct presentations of perceptual objects, and our perceptions must at the same time presuppose those very forms of unity (ideas) from the start in order to be cognitively significant for us.

Philosophical reflection always involves a kind of double vision which systematically misleads us. An important part of the Critique is the articulation of the metaphysical presuppositions (and necessary illusions) of academic philosophy (what Kant calls school philosophy) that arise as a result of the process through which we come to understand what we experience. I take Kant to show the way those presuppositions are grounded both in historical context and in the way in which historical context displays fundamental tendencies in the way in which we think about the world (including such oppositions as those between the rational and the sensible, the a priori and the a posteriori, the analytic and the synthetic). This is why the Critique closes with a "History of Pure Reason". I want to argue that the Critique is a fundamentally contextual enterprise; significance is for Kant inherently contextual because it is tied up with our purposes; this reflects the teleological functional character of human activity, a theme that Kant takes over from Plato, Aristotle and Leibniz (and in a more commonsensical form from Hume and Rousseau). The Critique unpacks this way in which significance is tied up with our ends and interests. In doing so, the Critique reveals the necessary illusions that taking things out of their appropriate context create for us. This exposure of the illusions inherent in our interests sets the stage for the world conception of philosophy that looks at things from what is of ultimate interest to us as human beings; Kant's cosmopolitan conception of philosophy is most comprehensively presented in his lectures on Anthropology from a Pragmatic Perspective. So against Rorty, and a caste of thousands, I want to argue that Kant does not define himself as the embodiment of professional

philosophy, but as its critic.

Part of what I want to do is not settled yet; so what I sketch here is somewhat vague, since I do not want to go into the little details that make all the difference:

(1) I could easily spend the quarter offering a synoptic and close reading of the Critique as a whole, one that explains why Kant says all of the things that he says in the various parts of the Critique and why it has those parts; I might still do that, since I am finishing a book on my revisionist reading of the Critique. But I also have a more encompassing agenda, which I have not tried to teach in a seminar form in recent years

(2) I would be happy to discuss the relationship of the Critique and of the Anthropology to the Groundwork, Critique of Practical Reason and Metaphysics of Morals. This would give one a sense of the positive content of the cosmopolitan conception of philosophy.

(3) Depending on the interest of students I would show how the Critique of Judgment and its fundamental principle of purposiveness is a development of Kant's idea that the significance that things have for us is a function of their relationship to our everyday commitments and ends. Interest and time allowing I would also discuss the way in which Schiller, Schelling, Hoelderlin and Hegel develop this conception especially in their aesthetics based on the Third Critique and of how this critique is appropriated by Heidegger in his later philosophy.

(4) I read Hegel's Phenomenology and Encyclopedia as an attempt to rewrite the teleological-functional account of ideas-guided significance in the Critique. A number of graduate students have been taking the reading groups Larry and I have been giving on this material, so it would not be impossible to show how Hegel appropriates the Kantian project of Critique if that is what students wanted to do.

(5) I have a story I have been working out of Kant's role in the anthropological turn in "continental" philosophy especially in the wake of Feuerbach. This has a bearing on the significance of Kant's cosmopolitan conception of anthropology for the philosophical conception of anthropology in important figures of continental philosophy like Bergson, Scheler, Heidegger, Cassirer, Foucault and Deleuze. Bergson's work, Husserl's Lectures on "Things and Space", Ideas I and II, and his First Philosophy and Crisis, Merleau-Ponty, Hegel and Dilthey's work, and the debate between Cassirer and Heidegger, and Deleuze's work (especially Difference and Repetition) all hinge on differences in the critical appropriations of Kant that go in slightly different directions but turn to a surprising degree on the nature of what Kant calls schematism and its relation to the Copernican Revolution. I think that deep problems in their respective philosophies show up in terms of the way in which they push and pull Kant's account and the relation between concepts, and time, history and agency in their attempts to make sense of how things are intelligible to us.

Erich R. and I have been working through Cassirer, especially Substance and Function and the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms with a number of graduate students, and I have taught several of the texts mentioned in (1-5) in upper division undergraduate courses that graduate students have sat in on, so it might be possible to re-engage with the material at a sophisticated level. I am open

to discussing the way in which the Critique bears on the foundational issues concerning historicity and agency, intuition, reason and its ideas, and the a priori that are at issue between Heidegger and Cassirer, issues that they inherit from Kant and Hegel. Although Heidegger's interpretation of Kant is flawed in some fundamental respects, I think that what Heidegger is doing in Division I and II of *Being and Time* is closer to Kant than he realized. Some of this is corrected in his book on Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics and in his lectures on the Basic Problems of Phenomenology, and on Human Freedom, but in the end, Heidegger's understanding of Kant is better revealed in his own positive position than in his critique of Kant. There is thus a way in which taking the second half of the course in the direction of an appreciation of what is at issue between Kant, Bergson, Husserl, Dilthey, Cassirer and Heidegger would be directly relevant to Mark's course on temporality in Heidegger.

PHIL282 (03), Mark Wrathall – Heidegger's account of temporality as the meaning of being [Wednesday, 10AM – 1 PM]

I want to work carefully through Heidegger's account of temporality as the sense or meaning of being – that is, as that on the basis of which entities are what they are, and as that which makes entities intelligible as entities. We'll focus, naturally, on *Being and Time*, particularly division two, and explore Heidegger's claims that

*there are different modes in which “temporality temporalizes itself”;

*the most fundamental form of temporality is disclosed in guilt and anxiety in the face of death;

*history is a concrete working out of temporality.

I anticipate starting the course by working quickly through the account of everyday temporality in division one of *Being and Time*, in order to focus on division two. We will probably also look at parallel accounts from Heidegger's lecture courses of the 1920s.

Depending on student interest, we could also pursue the theme in a variety of directions. I'm particularly interested in Heidegger's account of the temporality of Christian life, offered in a lecture course in 1920. We could explore Heidegger's appropriation of Kierkegaardian and Nietzschean approaches to time. We might also look at the influence Heidegger's account has had on Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Derrida, and (if I'm feeling particularly adventurous) Deleuze.

PHIL283 (01), Howard Wettstein – Philosophy of Religion [Tuesday, 11 AM – 2 PM]

I'm planning to do a fall seminar on the philosophy of religion, working through my new book, *The Significance of Religious Experience*, along with some of the literature that I discuss. Among the topics are religious affect (awe, love, gratitude), the role of religious doctrine, the transition from biblical thinking to philosophical thinking about religion and religious matters, the problem of evil (including a discussion of the Book of Job), and religious experience.

PHIL283 (02), Eric Schwitzgebel – “What Use Is Ethics?” [Monday, Noon- 3 PM]

The title and the topic of my seminar will be “What Use Is Ethics?” I haven't figured out yet what work I will be focusing on. Suggestions warmly welcomed! My proximal motivation for wanting to think through that issue is my work suggesting that ethics professors don't behave any differently than do other people of similar social background. The focus of the seminar, however, will *not* be on my work, but rather on the issues surrounding it, issues like: Could it

really be true that philosophical moral reflection has no influence on one's practical behavior? If so, what does that say about the value of philosophical moral reflection and its role in our lives? If philosophical moral reflection can influence real-world moral behavior, what kind of influence might it have and under what conditions, and how might we explain the apparent lack of a detectable differences between ethicists' and non-ethicists' moral behavior? Might there be cultural variation and variation in styles of philosophical reflection, such that the typical styles of moral reflection in 21st Anglophone academic philosophy are especially inert? Or throughout history and across culture has the main function of philosophical theorizing been to create linguistic justifications for what one would have done anyway? Even if ethics has no practical impact on the behavior of the ethicist, might it still be useful as a purely theoretical enterprise or for its impact on *others'* moral behavior? I anticipate drawing readings from the history of philosophy, from contemporary philosophy, and from contemporary empirical psychology.

Winter

PHIL 275, Peter Graham – First Year Proseminar in Epistemology and Metaphysics

This pro-seminar will be on epistemology. We will focus on classic and recent work on the analysis of propositional knowledge, and classic and recent work on internalist and externalist accounts of epistemic justification.

PHIL 282, Maudemarie Clark – Freud and Nietzsche.

An attempt to get at the similarities and differences between Freud and Nietzsche for the purpose of determining whether Freudian psychology carries out the lessons of Nietzsche's psychology, as Leiter thinks, advances well beyond them, as Lear thinks, or backtracks from them, as I am inclined to think. Freud and Nietzsche.

PHIL 283, Michael Nelson – Modal logic, actuality, and existence.

The course will be half a formal logic class, where we will discuss different modal systems (K, S4, S5) and derive theorems within those systems before moving to quantified modal logic. We will discuss technical problems concerning the interaction of modal operators, quantifiers, and an actuality operator. This will lead, in the second half of the seminar, to a more philosophical discussion of existence --- is existence a property of individuals and, if so, is it a contingent property, a property that some objects actually have but might have lacked?

PHIL 283, Andrews Reath – Scanlon's Contractualism.

The seminar will focus on T.M Scanlon's contractualism as presented in *What We Owe to Each Other* (1998). As time permits, we will also read his more recent *Moral Dimensions* (2008).

Spring

PHIL 275, John Fischer – First Year Proseminar in Epistemology and Metaphysics

Classic contemporary papers on free will and moral responsibility

PHIL 280, Larry Wright and Howie Wettstein – Wittgenstein
Part II of the *Philosophical Investigations*.

PHIL 282, Josef Muller – Seminar in Ancient Philosophy: Ancient Theories of Emotions
Survey of selected major theories of emotions in antiquity: their nature, role in a good life (if any), and their relation (if any) to ethical and political life. We will start by reading Book 2 of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* which is devoted to a discussion of emotions for rhetorical purposes. Besides philosophical literature, we will also pay attention to selected non-philosophical writings of Ancient Greek or Romans. We will try to find out how the Ancients understood and talked about emotions and their role in both moral and non-moral behavior. The course will then move on from Classical to Hellenistic period (e.g., Stoics) and, if time permits, to later antiquity (e.g., Plotinus). At this early date, I do not have a firm view about the particular readings. For students who read Greek, there will be a special weekly session in which we will read and discuss selected readings in the original.

PHIL 283, Agnieszka Jaworska – “**Margins of Agency: Lessons from Neuroscience.**”
What can we learn about foundational issues and concepts in moral theory and moral psychology (autonomy, valuing, reasons for action, moral responsibility, etc.) by studying cases of "agency at the margins:" addiction, Alzheimer's disease, fronto-temporal dementia, autism? Readings from contemporary literature in philosophy and neuroscience.