

Abstract: "Locke on the Locked Room"

In "Locke on the Locked Room" I examine Locke's claims that the man's stay in the locked room and the paralytic's sitting still are voluntary. I argue, contrary to the views of Gideon Yaffe, that Locke does not think that voluntariness requires an exertion on the part of agent to produce a given effect. Instead Locke follows Aquinas in maintaining that things we undergo can also count as voluntary provided we prefer them to their alternatives. I also argue against Yaffe's assimilation of Locke to the views of Susan Wolf by his claims that Locke thinks having our volitions determined by the good is constitutive of liberty and that Locke thinks moral praiseworthiness is consistent with an inability to have chosen otherwise. Instead I again argue that Locke's views are more similar to those of Aquinas, who holds that being determined by the good in general does not entail being determined by any particular good.

**"Locke on the Locked Room," *Locke Studies* Volume 5, 2005, pp. 58-74.**

Abstract: "Three Dualist Theories of the Passions:

In "Three Dualist Theories of the Passions," I discuss in a preliminary way the theories of Descartes, Spinoza, and Malebranche. I examine their accounts of the nature and origin of the passions of the soul, their accounts of how the passions influence our behavior, and their methods of controlling the passions.

**"Three Dualist Theories of the Passions," *Philosophical Topics* 19, 1991, pp. 153-200. Also published in *Essays on Descartes*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. pp. 210-236.**