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Reviewed work(s):

Source: *Studia Leibnitiana*, Bd. 28, H. 1 (1996), pp. 108-118

Published by: [Franz Steiner Verlag](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40694457>

Accessed: 28/02/2013 13:08

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The Being of Leibnizian Phenomena*

By

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Zusammenfassung

Robert M. Adams behauptet, daß Leibniz' zwei Konzeptionen der Körper als bloße Phänomene und als Aggregate von Substanzen konsistent und somit Bestandteile einer einzigen Theorie der Phänomene seien. Dagegen möchte ich hier zeigen, daß Adams' Strategie, Körper als intentionale Objekte der Perzeption zu verstehen – als objektive Realität von Ideen im kartesischen Sinn – nicht vereinbar damit ist, sie als Aggregate von Substanzen aufzufassen. Mit Adams stimme ich insofern überein, als Aggregate von Monaden sich nur im Geist als Einheit finden, ich bestreite jedoch, daß nur im Geist die Aggregate dann auch sind.

One of the leading problems in Leibniz scholarship is providing a coherent interpretation of his account of bodies. Leibniz describes bodies as mere phenomena, but also as aggregates of substances. Most commentators have thought that these two conceptions of bodies – as mere phenomena and as aggregates of substances – are in conflict. But in his recent book *Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist* and in his earlier paper *Phenomenalism and Corporeal Substance in Leibniz*¹, Robert Adams argues that in fact the two conceptions are consistent and belong to a single phenomenalistic theory².

Although I am persuaded by Adams that the aggregate conception of bodies is phenomenalistic in certain respects, it still seems to me that the phenomenalistic theory that Adams ascribes to Leibniz is incompatible with the aggregate conception. This is the topic of my paper, which will be divided into five parts. First, I will sketch the phenomenalistic theory Adams ascribes to Leibniz. Second, I will sketch Adams's explanation of why the aggregate conception should be incorporated into the phenomenalistic theory. Third, I will describe Adams's reasons for thinking that there is no conflict between the aggregate conception and the phenomenalistic conception of bodies. Fourth, I will present my argument that the phenomenalistic theory Adams ascribes to Leibniz is in fact inconsistent with the aggregate conception. Fifth, and finally, I will advance two positive interpretive claims.

* A version of this paper was delivered to the Leibniz Society of North America at the Pacific Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association, March 30, 1995. I would like to thank John Fischer, Carl Hoefer, Pierre Keller, Ken Winkler, and especially Robert Adams for their comments on earlier drafts.

1 R. M. Adams: *Phenomenalism and Corporeal Substance in Leibniz*, in: P. French/T. Uehling, Jr./H. Wettstein (eds.): *Contemporary Perspectives on the History of Philosophy* (= *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 8), Minneapolis 1983, pp. 217-257.

2 See R. M. Adams: *Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist*, Oxford 1994, pp. 218-219.

1. Leibniz's Phenomenalism

One familiar version of phenomenalism is that bodies are collections or sets of perceptions. Adams argues that Leibniz's phenomenalism is more nuanced than this familiar version, because it appeals to the Cartesian distinction between the formal reality of ideas or perceptions and their objective reality. According to Descartes, an idea has formal reality insofar as it is an act of the mind. The objective reality of an idea is the being of the thing represented by that act, insofar as it exists in the idea³. In other words, ideas or perceptions can be viewed as acts or modes of thought or they can be viewed as the objects of those thoughts. Adams maintains that on Leibniz's version of phenomenalism bodies are intentional objects, or, as he also puts it, they are to be identified with the representational content of perceptions. They are not to be identified with perceptions or collections of perceptions, insofar as those perceptions are considered as modifications of the mind.

Adams connects this fundamental distinction between perceptions as objects and perceptions as modifications with two other distinctions. First is a distinction between kinds of properties. Perceptions as modifications of the perceiving subject, that is, in their formal reality, have certain properties such as distinctness or confusedness that do not belong to perceptions insofar as they are intentional objects, that is, in their objective reality⁴. These properties that perceptions have as modifications of a perceiving subject Adams refers to as psychological properties of perceptions⁵. Conversely, perceptions in their objective reality, or as Adams sometimes puts it, perceptions "as phenomena"⁶ have certain properties that do not belong to perceptions as modifications of the mind⁷. So Adams attributes to Leibniz the view that "Considered as phenomena, bodies still have the properties of bodies"⁸. These properties that belong to ideas considered as objects of thought include the Cartesian modes of extension, extension itself, and most importantly, causal properties⁹.

3 See R. Descartes: *Meditationes de prima philosophia, praefatio ad lectorem*, quoted from *Œuvres de Descartes*, publ. par C. Adam et P. Tannery, Paris 1897-1913, 12 volumes (AT), VII, p. 7 and *Rationes dei existentiam & animae a corpore distinctionem probantes*; AT VII, p. 161.

4 See Adams (see note 2), p. 221.

5 See *ibid.*, p. 223.

6 *Ibid.*, pp. 222-223.

7 Adams does not always restrict his use of the term "phenomena" to perceptions in their objective reality. At one point he also says of the phenomena themselves that they can be construed either as properties or as objects of the mind (see *ibid.*, p. 221). It is worth noting as well that Adams thinks that Leibniz holds not only that perceptions as modifications of the perceiving subject have properties, that is, psychological properties, but also that they are properties (see *ibid.*) or psychological states (see *ibid.*, p. 220) of the mind as opposed to being objects of the mind.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 223.

9 See *ibid.*, pp. 232, 222.

The second, apparently related, distinction concerns different types of analysis or reduction. One type of analysis or reduction is referred to as psychological¹⁰. By means of a psychological analysis the analyzandum is reduced to psychological properties. Adams claims that Berkeley provides a psychological analysis of bodies, whereas Leibniz does not. The contrasting type of analysis of bodies offered by Leibniz is for our purposes most usefully described negatively as being non-psychological. In spite of claiming that Berkeley's analysis of bodies is psychological and Leibniz's is non-psychological, Adams thinks that Berkeley and Leibniz are fundamentally on the same side¹¹.

It is not clear to me, however, that Berkeley's analysis of bodies really is psychological in Adams's sense of the term. I believe, and here my views have been influenced by Ken Winkler, that there is plenty of room to argue for what I take to be the more charitable interpretation that Berkeley is committed to the same Cartesian distinction between considering ideas as acts of the mind and considering them as objects of the mind and that his reduction of bodies to ideas concerns ideas considered as objects of the mind and not ideas considered as acts or modifications of the mind¹².

2. Leibniz's Non-Psychological Analysis of Bodies – the Aggregate Conception

Leibniz's non-psychological analysis of bodies reduces them to aggregates of indivisible, simple substances¹³. Bodies are metaphysical or logical constructions out of these substances¹⁴. The substances are not parts of aggregates, but elements of aggregates¹⁵. Aggregates can have parts, but those parts are themselves sub-aggregates. Adams, following Leibniz, illustrates the distinction between parts and elements by analogy with lines and points. Points are not parts of a line, but elements out of which a line is constructed. Lines do have parts, but those parts are themselves line segments which are also constructed out of points¹⁶. A part must be homogeneous with the whole, but an element need not be.

This analogy is not trouble-free. While it is clear that Leibniz uses the analogy to establish the negative point that substances are not parts of aggregates just as points are not parts of lines, it is far less clear that he is committed to what I take to be Adams's positive point that aggregates are supposed to be

10 See *ibid.*, p. 221.

11 See *ibid.*, p. 224.

12 See K. P. Winkler: *Berkeley: An Interpretation*, Oxford 1989, pp. 290-309.

13 See Adams (see note 2), p. 225.

14 See *ibid.*, p. 245.

15 See *ibid.*, p. 244.

16 See *ibid.*, pp. 274-275.

constructed out of substances as elements in the way that lines are constructed out of points as elements. On several occasions Leibniz contrasts the composition of the multitude from real unities with the composition of the continuum from points, claiming that only the construction of the multitude from real unities is possible (see GP IV, 491, 511). He maintains that it is impossible to construct a line out of points because points are merely boundaries or modalities. Since the continuum is merely ideal, it will, according to Leibniz, be metaphysically prior to its divisions and thus not constructed out of the products of that division. But in the case of a phenomenon, the unities out of which it is constructed are metaphysically prior to it.

How could such an account of bodies as aggregates of substances be phenomenalistic? Leibniz follows his scholastic predecessors in maintaining the equivalence of being and unity. Something has being if and only if it is a unity (see GP II, 97). A fully real being derives its unity from something internal. So a fully real being is an intrinsic unity. Unlike substances whose unity derives from something internal, aggregates of substances derive their unity from something external. But in Leibniz's world, there are no real relations, not even spatial relations, which could serve as an external source of unity. So it is only by being perceived in a certain way that substances constitute an aggregate. In other words, it is only by their multitude being expressed in the unity of a perceiver that they constitute an aggregate. Since aggregates of substances have their unity only in the mind, Leibniz concludes that bodies are not fully real but what he calls appearances or phenomena. His denial that bodies are fully real amounts, therefore, to the denial that they are intrinsic unities. They are phenomena, because, as he sometimes puts it, they are unities only by convention (see GP II, 101, 252).

Adams illustrates the philosophical point that an aggregate of real beings that has its unity only in the mind should be regarded as merely an appearance or phenomenon by means of his ingenious mob example. We are invited to suppose that the images of thousands of people in different cities are combined by means of a cleverly contrived network of glass fibers to produce in you an image of an angry mob. The point is that there is a difference between a real mob and an apparent mob and that the mob generated by putting images together is only apparent. Adams says that we might say that the apparent mob is an aggregate of real human beings¹⁷, but that does not keep it from being a mere phenomenon. It is a phenomenon because the grouping in virtue of which the human beings constitute a mob is based entirely on how those human beings are perceived.

Let me add as an aside that we would also say that the mob is apparent even if the image of a thousand people, who as a matter of fact are scattered around the globe, is produced outside of the mind, for example, on a television or computer screen. Such a mob would not be phenomenal in the strict sense because the principles of aggregation that produce the image are not mind-

17 See *ibid.*, p. 248.

dependent, but it would still be merely apparent, because a mind-independent principle of aggregation might still produce something that is not real.

Leibnizian bodies are similarly held to be phenomena because the existence of the aggregate also arises solely from how we perceive the individual substances which constitute it. The grouping relations originate from our confused perceptions of the individual substances.

3. Adams's Account of the Source of the Apparent Conflict

Adams locates the source of the apparent conflict between the thesis that bodies are phenomena and the thesis that bodies are aggregates of substances in the assumption that an aggregate of Fs must have the same ontological status as the Fs¹⁸. In other words, the worry is that if bodies are aggregates of substances they must be substances as well, and so they couldn't be phenomena.

Adams argues that it is plausible that Leibniz would reject this assumption. First, he argues that Leibnizian aggregates are akin to sets, and just as it is highly controversial to suppose that a set always has the same ontological status as its elements, so it should be plausible to deny that an aggregate of Fs always has the same ontological status as the Fs. Second, Adams argues that Leibnizian aggregates are logical or metaphysical constructions, and a construction need not have the same ontological status as the things out of which it is constructed.

A second potential source of conflict between the thesis that bodies are phenomena and the thesis that bodies are aggregates of substances concerns Leibniz's account of the distinction between real and imaginary bodies¹⁹. That is, although Leibniz maintains that since bodies are phenomena they are not fully real in the way that substances are, he also maintains nevertheless that within the realm of phenomena we can also distinguish between the real and the imaginary. Bodies that we dream or hallucinate are imaginary.

Leibniz often explains the difference between the two types of phenomena by appeal to the notion of a harmony of perceptions. He locates the reality of matter and motion "in the harmony of perceivers with themselves (at different times) and with the other perceivers"²⁰. But in his mature writings he also suggests that phenomena are real because their reality is borrowed from the reality of the substances of which they are aggregates. These two accounts of the reality of phenomena might be thought to conflict, but Adams argues that they are in fact different layers of the same analysis. He claims that Leibniz holds that those phenomena that are real in the weak sense of being harmonious are precisely those that are real in the stronger sense of expressing monads that exist²¹.

18 See *ibid.*, p. 244.

19 See *ibid.*, pp. 223, 255-261.

20 GP II, 270, quoted from *Leibniz. Philosophical Papers and Letters*, transl. by L. E. Loemker, Dordrecht 1969, p. 537.

21 See Adams (see note 2), p. 261.

4. Objections to the Proposed Reconciliation

While I agree with what I take to be Adams's fundamental insight that the existence of Leibnizian aggregates is mind, or at least perceiver, dependent because the principle of aggregation or unification of monads is that those monads are perceived in a certain way, it still seems to me that there is an irreconcilable tension between the aggregate conception of body and the phenomenalistic conception of body that Adams ascribes to Leibniz. The problem is that an idea taken objectively, in anything remotely like the Cartesian sense of the term, cannot have substances, that is, beings with formal reality, as its elements. An alternative way to state my point is that the objective being of idea is objective through and through. If it has many layers, one is not going to find formal being at the bottom. It is as objectionable to say that the objective being of an idea has substances as elements as it would be to say that the objective reality of an idea has substances as parts.

We can illustrate this objection by returning to Adams's mob example. It certainly seems correct that the mob exists "only in the image presented to you"²². It has no other reality. It is a phenomenal being, a being only by virtue of the representational content of our ideas. But I think it is crucial that we resist Adams's suggestion that this apparent mob is an aggregate of real human beings. As Adams himself describes the example –

"Suppose through a cleverly contrived network of glass fibers the images of a thousand different people walking, talking, and gesturing on a thousand different streets of a hundred different cities were combined to give you an image of an angry mob"²³

– what is aggregated to create the image of the mob is not human beings, but images of human beings. And it seems mistaken to suppose that in constructing something by aggregating images of human beings one is constructing something by aggregating human beings.

Just as Adams's apparent mob is an aggregate of images of human beings unified only in the mind or on the computer screen, I would argue that if the objective being of an idea can be an aggregate, it can only be an aggregate of other things in terms of their objective being, that is, in terms of their being objects of thought.

It is worthwhile to explore further Adams's conception of objective reality to see why he is willing to attribute to Leibniz the view that phenomena, understood as the objective reality of ideas, might be an aggregate of things, taken in their formal reality, as elements. As already noted, Adams identifies the objective reality of an idea with its intentional object or representational content. He also makes the further identification of phenomena with "the objects of a story – a story told or approximated by perception, common sense

22 See *ibid.*, p. 249.

23 *Ibid.*, p. 248.

and science”²⁴. It is this last identification that does the crucial piece of work, for Adams argues that “it is part of the story told by science, and less distinctly by common sense and perception, that every extended thing is composed of actual parts, and that is enough to make extended things aggregates in Leibniz’s book”²⁵. Adams argues moreover that while this story does not include the thesis that these extended things are composed of substances, it doesn’t exclude that thesis either.

If this line of argument is supposed to lead, and I think it is, to the conclusion that the objective being of an idea can have beings taken in their formal reality as elements, then I think it is fallacious. Consider the claim that Paul Bunyan is composed of flesh and bones. Taken in one way it is true, taken in another way it is false. If we take that claim to mean that it is part of the story of Paul Bunyan that he is composed of flesh and bones, then it is true. But if we take it to be expressing a particular instance of a general thesis about the ontological status of fictional creatures, that they are composed of flesh and bones, then it is false. It would be inconsistent with supposing that Paul Bunyan is fictional to assert truly in this ontological sense that he is composed of flesh and bones. Things that are composed of flesh and bones in the ontological sense are real, not fictional. Similar to this ambiguity concerning claims about fictional objects, there is an ambiguity concerning claims about intentional objects that I believe undermines Adams’s argument. This is perhaps best seen by returning to the mob example. The key claim that the mob is an aggregate of real human beings is true if taken in a way corresponding to the first way of understanding the claim that Paul Bunyan is composed of flesh and bones, but false if taken in a way corresponding to the second way of understanding that claim. That is, if we take the claim that the apparent mob is an aggregate of real human beings to mean that in perceiving that image of a mob we are perceiving an image of an aggregate of human beings, then it is true. But if we take it to be a claim about the ontological status of that image, understood as an intentional object, that it is composed of human beings, then it is false. By the same token, the claim that bodies, understood as intentional objects, are aggregates of substances is ambiguous. If it is meant to be making an ontological claim about the nature of bodies, then it is inconsistent with supposing that they are merely intentional objects, analogous to the way that it would be inconsistent with supposing that Paul Bunyan is fictional to assert truly in the ontological sense that he is composed of flesh and bones. But if the claim that bodies are aggregates of substances is merely meant to be part of a story without any real ontological bite to it, then I think it misses the force of Leibniz’s claim that bodies are aggregates of substances, because his claim is supposed to have real ontological bite.

In response to an earlier draft of this paper, Adams has constructed an even more ingenious example than the mob example:

24 Ibid., p. 219.

25 Ibid., p. 247.

"Is Napoleon Bonaparte (the actual human being, who was born on one island and died on a smaller one) a character in Tolstoy's *War and Peace*, or is he only represented there by a fictitious character quite distinct from him, who merely shares his name and some of his properties? On this question I find the first, less purist view more natural than the second, though I could hardly claim it's a crushing objection if a theory ends up committed to the second view. But if you do think the actual Napoleon can be a character in a novel, why couldn't a real substance be an element of an intentional object?"²⁶

I certainly agree that one can write a novel about a historical figure. And in that sense it seems perfectly plausible to say that an actual person can be a character in a novel. Similarly, I would be willing to say that the objective reality of an idea can represent actual things in the world. But I don't think it follows that if x represents y , then y is an element of x in what I take to be Leibniz's sense of what it is to be an element.

Perhaps at bottom is an issue about the nature of propositions and their relationship to appearances. Suppose I tell a lie about someone. It seems plausible to say that the lie expresses a proposition. If one holds that the person is a constituent of that proposition, then one might also say that the proposition is a logical construction which includes the person as an element. Similarly, it might be thought that propositions can include monads as elements. And consistent with Adams's claim that Leibnizian appearances are stories, we might say that since stories are collections of propositions, appearances are collections of propositions which can include monads as elements. I myself would be reluctant to attribute such a theory of propositions to Leibniz. But I think a fundamental objection to such an interpretation would be that Leibnizian aggregates are not propositions or collections of propositions. And even more fundamentally, since propositions are not completely mind-dependent if they include as constituents beings in the world, it seems to me that a theory that takes bodies to be appearances, appearances to be propositions, and propositions to include as elements or constituents beings whose existence is not entirely dependent on their being perceived is not phenomenalistic.

An important related objection concerns the properties of phenomena, that is, the properties that belong to ideas considered as intentional objects. Leibniz maintains that the most important of these properties, the derivative forces that constitute the essence of body, are modifications of the primitive forces that are properties of the constitutive substances (see GM VI, 236, GP II, 251). But if phenomena just are ideas taken objectively, this would entail that properties pertaining to the objective reality of ideas are modifications of properties pertaining to beings in their formal reality. This, however, is entirely foreign to the Cartesian notion of objective reality²⁷.

26 E-mail from Robert Adams, March 24, 1995.

27 Nicholas Jolley has also claimed that "a phenomenalistic interpretation of bodies is not consistent with the claim that physical force derives from the primary force of monads" (*Leibniz and Phenomenalism*, in: *Studia Leibnitiana* XVIII/1 (1986), p. 51).

Up to this point, the objections I have raised to Adams's attempt to reconcile the aggregate and phenomenalist conceptions of body have turned on claims about the kinds of relations that can obtain between objective reality and formal reality. I have claimed that according to the Cartesian conception of objective reality, insofar as something has objective reality, it cannot be a modification of things with formal reality or have them as elements.

One might also object to Adams's claims about the relationship between objective reality and appearances. The most important change in Adams's interpretation between the earlier paper and the book, made under the influence of papers by Glenn Hartz and Jan Cover, concerns the issue of the real versus the apparent properties of bodies²⁸. In his earlier article Adams tried to explain how Leibniz could consistently maintain that bodies are continuous, but in the book he claims that Leibniz "probably ought to hold that bodies only appear to be continuous"²⁹. He also in the book expresses his preference for the view that shape only appears to belong to bodies. Given Adams's identification of bodies with the objective reality of ideas, these claims have the consequence that an idea, insofar as it has objective reality, can appear other than it is. But this might seem to conflict with the fundamental motive for introducing the notion of objective reality in the first place.

On the standard interpretation of Cartesian epistemology, the notion of objective reality is introduced in order to fulfill a crucial role in his foundationalist project. Descartes thinks we need some object of thought for which there is no appearance/reality distinction and hence no uncertainty to serve as a starting point from which we can attain knowledge of the external world. This is why Descartes asserts that "nam quaecumque percipimus tanquam in idearum objectis, ea sunt in ipsis ideis objective"³⁰. If we couple this fundamental feature of the Cartesian conception of objective reality – that it is as it appears – with the move that Adams attributes to Leibniz of identifying bodies with the objective reality of ideas, it would follow that if bodies appear to be continuous, then they are continuous. Therefore the objection is that Adams cannot consistently maintain both that bodies should be identified with the objective reality of ideas in the Cartesian sense and that they only appear to be continuous.

Underlying this objection is, I believe, a misunderstanding of the role of objective reality in Cartesian epistemology. I do not think Descartes is a foundationalist of the sort who is searching for some kind of reality which is exactly as it appears that can serve as a starting point for knowledge of the external world. On the contrary, I think that the notion of objective reality plays the same role for Descartes that it did for his scholastic predecessors. Descartes,

28 See G. A. Hartz/J. Cover: *Space and Time in the Leibnizian Metaphysic*, in: *Nous* 22 (1989), pp. 493-519; G. A. Hartz: *Leibniz's Phenomenalisms*, in: *The Philosophical Review* 101 (1992), pp. 511-549.

29 Adams (see note 2), p. 233.

30 *Rationes dei existentiam & animae a corpore distinctionem probantes*; AT VII, 161.

I believe, shared with his scholastic predecessors two fundamental epistemological claims. First, we can have cognition of something external to the soul only if that thing comes to exist in our soul. Second, those things of which we have cognition do not exist in the soul in the same way that they exist in the world. Things as they exist in the world have one kind of reality – formal reality. Insofar as those things exist in the soul they have another kind of reality – objective reality. And just as some of Descartes’s scholastic predecessors would allow that, for example, the species of light can appear as color³¹, I think it is consistent with the Cartesian conception of objective reality to suppose that the objective reality of an idea might appear to be other than it is. For example, Descartes says that the idea of the sun is the sun itself existing in our mind objectively³². It is not clear to me that he is also committed to saying that when we have a sensory idea of the sun as yellow, the sun as it exists in the mind has the property of yellowness or that yellowness exists in the mind objectively. I think he could equally well say that the sun as it exists in the mind objectively merely appears to be yellow.

5. Positive Claims

In light of my discussion of these two basic criticisms of Adams’s interpretation, I would like to make two positive interpretive claims about Leibniz’s account of body. My first claim is somewhat speculative. It strikes me that Leibniz, in contrast to Descartes, rejects what I take to be the Aristotelian view that cognition involves the known or perceived object coming to exist in the mind in another mode of being. Thus I read Leibniz as trying to make do without the Cartesian/Aristotelian notion of objective reality. Instead he tries to make do with just objects and their appearances to us. This is not to endorse what Hartz and Cover refer to as the standard interpretation according to which Leibniz maintains a two-level metaphysical scheme: one level of fully real substances and a second phenomenal level³³. I agree that Leibniz draws a crucial distinction between appearances and abstractions such as space which constitute a third level of the merely ideal, but I also agree with Adams that the ultimately real monads and the merely ideal space are both involved in the construction of phenomena³⁴.

My second positive interpretative claim concerns the being of Leibnizian phenomena. I agree with Adams’s fundamental insight that monads are unified into an aggregate only in virtue of their being perceived as a unity. So there is a perfectly clear sense in which the unity of aggregates of monads is mind-

31 See A. Ruvio: *Commentarii in libros Aristotelis De Anima: una cum dubiis et quaestionibus hac tempestate in scholis agitari solitis*, Lugdunum 1620, p. 394.

32 See *Responsio auctoris ad primas objectionis*; AT VII, 102.

33 See Hartz/Cover (see note 28), p. 494.

34 See Adams (see note 2), p. 254.

dependent. And given Leibniz's commitment to the equivalence of unity and being, it follows that the existence of aggregates of monads is also mind-dependent. But I don't think it follows from this that Leibniz's theory is phenomenalistic in the full-blown sense that it identifies aggregates with merely intentional objects or with the objective reality of ideas. I do not even think it follows that his theory is phenomenalistic in a weaker sense of maintaining that the being of aggregates consists entirely in their being perceived as unified. Instead I think that Leibniz's identification of being and unity is merely extensional. Something has being if and only if it has unity, but what its being consists in might be different from what its unity consists in. The being of an aggregate consists at least partly in the being of its constituent monads, as Adams himself asserts at one point³⁵. But on Leibniz's view, the being of those constituent monads is not a fact about their being perceived. So if bodies are aggregates, their being does not consist entirely in their constituents being perceived in a certain way, it consists partly in the being of the constituent monads. Therefore I don't think it can be consistently maintained that "aggregates have their unity, and therefore their being, only in the mind"³⁶.

I believe that there is historical precedent for understanding the doctrine of the equivalence of being and unity to be mere extensional equivalence. Aquinas, for example, seems to think that truth, even though it is convertible with the thing that is, is found principally in the understanding, unlike the thing that is³⁷.

My conclusion then is that it is fully consistent of Leibniz to assert both that bodies are appearances and that they are aggregates of monads, but the resulting theory is not phenomenalistic.

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35 Adams makes the point in terms of the reality of aggregates (see Adams (see note 2), p. 260, see also p. 254).

36 Ibid., p. 246.

37 See Thomas Aquinas: *The Disputed Questions on Truth* q1, a1 & 2.