

FREEDOM AND WEAKNESS OF WILL

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Abstract

Can absolute freedom of will be defended by arguing that apparent cases of diminished freedom when we act out of passion are cases of weakness of will? Rogers Albritton thought so. What is intriguing about Albritton's view is that he thought when we act from desire we are making choices, yet our desires are not functioning as reasons for those choices. So our desires must be influencing our choices in some other unspecified way that does not diminish our freedom. I challenge the coherence of this position. My strategy is to examine the views of leading theorists of the will – Descartes, Aquinas and Reid – to argue that the only clear way in which passions can influence our choices so that we can accurately be described as weak-willed and yet nevertheless free is that our passions influence our choices by providing reasons for them.

In defending what he took to be Descartes's view that we have absolute freedom of will, Rogers Albritton in his 1985 APA Presidential Address seemed to suggest that the most troubling sorts of cases for him are those in which our behavior is '*from desire, out of fear, on impulse and so on.*'¹ In other words, what Descartes called the passions of the soul are what Albritton took to be the biggest threat to the thesis that we have absolute freedom of will. How could our will remain absolutely free when we act out of fear?

Albritton's first step in defending the view that even the passions do not diminish the will's absolute freedom was to distinguish between acting from one's desires and acting in view of one's desires. When we act in view of one of our passions, the passion is playing the role of providing us with a reason for acting in the same way someone else's desires might give us a reason for acting.² Albritton argued that since reasons don't have the power

¹ See Rogers Albritton, 'Freedom of the Will and Freedom of Action', *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, 59 (1985) p. 248: 'I don't see unfreedom of will even in this most promising part of the forest.'

² *Ibid.*

to diminish our freedom of will,³ when we act in view of one of our passions our freedom of will is not diminished. But he thought it is rare that passions are playing only the role of providing reasons for action. Usually when passions play a role in our behavior, we are acting from passion.⁴

What happens when we act from passion? One possibility Albritton considered is that we are not really acting at all. Acting from passion is like a seizure or like being thrown violently into bed or being chained up.⁵ The idea here, as I understand it, is that the will is bypassed. We aren't making a choice. But Albritton apparently believed that this possibility does not explain all or even perhaps most of the instances when we act from passion.⁶ He seemed to think instead that in most cases, or at least in the cases most troubling for the thesis that we have absolute freedom of will, when we act from passion we are making a choice. The passion is not bypassing the will but rather, and this is my language not his, operating through the will.

After introducing the notion of acting '*from desire, out of fear, on impulse, and so on*' and mentioning the possibility that such cases are like seizures in which we are not acting, Albritton proceeded to consider cases, focusing primarily on alcoholism, that he said were neither like seizures nor fully automatic.⁷ So these are cases in which the will is not bypassed, yet also apparently cases in which the agent is not acting merely in view of her desire. Albritton did not explicitly state that the three cases he mentioned – addiction, alcoholism, and child molesting – are cases of acting from passion, but the flow of the discussion strongly suggests that he thought they were.⁸ However, even if he would have denied that addiction, alcoholism, and child molesting are cases of acting from passion, the main point is that he thought they are cases in

³ Ibid., pp. 246–248.

⁴ Ibid., p. 248: 'Acting *from desire* is quite another and commoner thing. Indeed pure cases of acting in consideration of a (felt) desire must be rare at best.'

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ This is something I had misunderstood before. I claimed in 'Strength and Freedom of Will: Descartes and Albritton', *Philosophical Studies*, 77 (1995), pp. 249–250, that Albritton thought all cases of acting from passion were cases in which choice is bypassed.

⁷ Albritton, p. 249.

⁸ My earlier failure to recognize that Albritton thought that when we act from passion we are often making a choice was based on my failure to see that his discussion of alcoholism is a continuation of his discussion of acting from passion. I thought before that he was bringing up the cases of addiction, alcoholism, and child molesting as a different set of cases.

which the will is not bypassed and yet whatever is motivating us to act is not providing us with a reason for acting. His way of preserving the will's absolute freedom is to suggest that the alcoholic is suffering from weakness of will ('Perhaps he just hasn't the strength of will to hold out') and that freedom of will is distinct from strength of will ('*strength* of will is one thing and *freedom* of will is another. Isn't it? Or do you think not? I think it is.')

What is intriguing about Albritton's view is that he thought that when we act from desire we are making choices, yet our desires are not providing us with reasons for those choices. So our desires must be influencing our choices in some other unspecified way that does not diminish our freedom. But I am inclined to doubt whether this view is coherent. Even granting that strength of will is one thing and freedom of will is another, it seems to me that the only clear way in which passions can influence our choices so that we can accurately be described as weak-willed and yet nevertheless free is that our passions influence our choices by providing reasons for them. I don't see that there is any other way that our passions can influence our choices so that we can be accurately described as weak-willed without at the same time diminishing our freedom of will, perhaps even to the point of unfreedom. But Albritton's view will be in trouble so long as there is some way that our passions can influence our choices so as to diminish our freedom of will.¹⁰

My strategy to explain these concerns will be to explore the theories of three leading historical theorists of the will – Aquinas, Descartes and Reid. Their various accounts of how the passions might influence our choices will provide us with a view of the landscape of possible philosophical theories. Although the evidence is conflicting in Descartes, all three philosophers seem to think that the passions can diminish our freedom of will so that we are less than fully free. But of the three only Aquinas is clearly committed to the view that so long as we retain the use of reason our passions cannot diminish our freedom to the point of unfreedom, and, what is most significant, he seems to be able to maintain this view precisely because he thinks the passions influence the will by functioning as reasons. As we will see when we examine the other possible ways suggested by Descartes and Reid in which

⁹ Albritton, p. 249.

¹⁰ I am indebted here to Josh Bright.

the passions might influence our choices, it seems plausible to say that they can diminish the will's freedom to the point of unfreedom.

Before turning to the views of these philosophers, let me say a little more about the notions of providing a reason and operating or functioning as a reason.¹¹ Passions or desires could be regarded as providing reasons for action on the grounds that the mere fact that we have a desire or passion provides a reason for satisfying it. This is what Albritton seemed to have in mind when he talked about acting in view of a desire. We might also be said to act in view of a passion or desire if we think that a desire or passion is undesirable, and thus that we have a reason for acting in a way either to prevent ourselves from pursuing its object or even to rid ourselves of the desire or passion.¹² Still a third way in which passions can be regarded as providing reasons for action is by representing their objects as good or as harmful. The idea here is that we have a reason to pursue something that appears good or to avoid something that appears harmful, and that passions therefore provide reasons for acting in virtue of representing things as good or as harmful.

My inclination is to link the first and third ways in which passions can be regarded as providing reasons for action. That is, it seems to me that the reason why the mere fact that we have a desire for something provides a reason to satisfy it is precisely that a desire for something is not distinct from a representation of the thing as good, or at least as pleasant, and that we have a reason to pursue something in virtue of its appearing good or pleasant.

If our desire or passion for an object did not represent it as good or as pleasant, then I would say that the passion or desire might provide us with an end or goal, that is, something we are pushed toward or aimed at, but it would not provide us with a reason for pursuing it. I myself am inclined to think that such a case is not possible, that desires or passions can only push us toward or aim us at things by representing them as good or as pleasant. However, many philosophers have thought otherwise.

¹¹ This part of the discussion is deeply indebted to a conversation with Julie Tannenbaum.

¹² I am inclined to the view that the mere fact that we have a desire provides a reason, however weak and easily overridden, for satisfying it. So I would say that a desire to do something that all things considered would be harmful to me, provides reasons to act in opposing ways. It provides a reason to satisfy that desire, but it also provides a reason for me to do take the steps necessary to prevent myself from trying to satisfy that desire.

My strong suspicion is that Albritton must have been such a philosopher. If we can be said to act from desire or out of passion without the desire or passion providing a reason for our choice to act that way, this would seem to be possible only because the desire is pushing us toward something, that is, pushing us toward making that choice, without representing its object as good or as pleasant.

It is important to note here that these considerations reveal that Albritton's contrast between acting in view of desire and acting from or out of desire is potentially confusing. First, I want to say that when I am weak-willed I am acting from or out of desire, but I would also say that in those cases the desire is providing a reason for my choice, because it is representing its object as good or as pleasant. Thus if we can be said to act in view of desire whenever a desire influences our choice by operating as a reason for it, I would say in contrast to Albritton that instances of acting in view of desire are in fact quite common. Since Albritton is contrasting acting in view of desire and acting from or out of desire, his cases of acting from or out of desire have to be cases in which the desire is not providing a reason for acting. Second, if Albritton thought that desires provide us with end or goals without representing them as good or as pleasant, then it must be the case that when we act in view of desire what is going on is that we take the mere fact that the desire provides us with an end or goal as providing us with reason for pursuing for it. I think the plausibility of this interpretation is confirmed by the fact that Albritton thought cases of acting in view of desire are rare.

Finally, let me distinguish between providing a reason and operating or functioning as a reason. I will suggest below in discussing Descartes that a desire or passion, even though it represents something as good or pleasant, harmful or unpleasant, and thereby provides a reason for making a choice, might not necessarily operate as a reason in our choice. To operate as a reason, the desire or passion must influence our choice in virtue of its providing a reason.

Let me turn now to Descartes. Descartes did say that the will by its nature is so free that it can never be constrained (I 41).¹³

¹³ References to Descartes's *The Passions of the Soul* will be cited in parentheses in the text by part and article. References to Descartes's works other than *The Passions of the Soul* will be cited in parentheses in the text by edition, volume, and page number. 'AT' is the abbreviation for *Oeuvres de Descartes*, Vols. I–XIII and Supplement, edited by Charles Adam

Nevertheless, he thought we were fully free only when our volitions (that is, our judgments and our volitions to pursue or to shun something) are compelled by clear and distinct ideas (AT VII 432–3; CSM II 292). Passions are ideas according to Descartes, but they are never clear and distinct ideas (I 28). Thus Descartes believed that we are never fully free when we act from passion. So he thought that if we have a weak soul and follow our present passions instead of our firm and determinate judgments concerning good and bad, then we are not as free as we would be if we acted in accordance with clear and distinct ideas (I 48). Given that Descartes was committed to the view that we are more free when our acts of will are compelled by clear and distinct ideas than when we are not, then it seems wrong to say, as Albritton did, that he thought our freedom of will is absolute, because saying that the freedom of will is absolute seems to imply that our acts of will are always fully free. But there is room to argue that in these sorts of cases when we are not fully free Descartes thought our will still is not constrained, because he might have thought that constraint requires that our freedom be diminished to the point of unfreedom.

There is, however, some evidence that Descartes thought the passions could diminish our freedom of will to the point of unfreedom. First, he said in a letter to Princess Elizabeth that the passions might cause us to lose our free judgment (AT IV 411, CSMK 287), where judgment, according to Descartes, is a mode of willing (AT VIII 17–18, CSM I 204). What I take him to mean by this is not that the passions could cause us to lose our capacity for judgment, because I believe he thinks that is an impossibility, but rather that the passions might cause us to make judgments that are not free. Second, in the *Passions of the Soul* he talked about the soul becoming enslaved when the will is agitated by opposing passions, ‘obeying first the one and then the other’ (I 48).

Since Descartes says conflicting things about the possibility of the passions limiting the freedom of the will, it is far from clear that he even agrees with Albritton’s view that the will’s freedom cannot be diminished. But significant differences emerge when

and Paul Tannery (Leopold Cerf, 1897–1913). ‘CSM’ is the abbreviation for *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, Vols. I and II, translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge University Press, 1985). ‘CSMK’ is the abbreviation for *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, Vol. III, translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny (Cambridge University Press, 1991).

we examine their conceptions of the will. Albritton denied that reasons bind the will, but Descartes thought reasons that are clearly and distinctly perceived do bind us, and in so doing they maximize our freedom of will. Descartes believed that the will is inclined only toward truth and goodness (AT VII 432; CSM II 292). Furthermore, he thought that so long as we are attending to a clear and distinct idea of something as true or as good, it is impossible for us not to embrace it.

One possible interpretation of why Descartes might have thought that our volitions are necessitated by our clear and distinct ideas, so long as we are attending to them, is that our clear and distinct ideas cause our volitions. Since reasons for Descartes just are ideas, this would amount to saying that reasons cause our volitions. This in turn might seem to imply that such volitions are not up to us and hence not free, but Descartes could be defended by arguing that since clear and distinct ideas are derived from our nature (AT VII 38–39, CSM II 26–27), any volitions they cause are up to us. If Descartes did think that reasons cause our volitions, his view would be very far from Albritton's, who, as well as I can determine, defended absolute freedom of the will in part by denying that reasons cause our volitions.

An alternative interpretation of Descartes is that he did not believe reasons cause our volitions, instead we cause them (I 17). Even on this interpretation, since Descartes still thought that we are constructed in such a way that we necessarily choose a clearly perceived good, so long as we are perceiving it, his view would still be fundamentally different from Albritton's, because he would still be committed to our being bound by clearly and distinctly perceived reasons.

The same ambiguity as to whether clear and distinct ideas are merely reasons for or also causes of volitions infects Descartes's account of the passions. In contrast to Albritton, Descartes did not say that passions only rarely operate as reasons. Descartes thought that passions represent their objects as good or as harmful (II 138),¹⁴ which can readily be taken to suggest that they always influence our choices by providing reasons for them, in other

¹⁴ In that passage Descartes said that passions represent goods and evils, he did not explicitly state that they represent them as good and as evil. However, since he thought that the passions incite the will to do things, and since he thought we are moved to pursue or avoid things only because they are represented to us as good or as evil, he must have thought that the passions represent things as good and as evil.

words, to use Albritton's language, that we always act in view of them. But I don't think the fact that Descartes thought of passions as representations of things as good or as harmful shows conclusively that he thought that they influence our choices by providing reasons for them. We are, he thought, wired up to go for what appears to us to be good. Couldn't such appearances be causes without operating as reasons? That is, just because an idea represents something as good or pleasant and thereby provides us with a reason for acting does not entail that it influences our choice in virtue of providing a reason for it. To help see this, consider animals. Although Descartes certainly denied that animals are conscious and have mental representations, it seems likely to me that animals go for things that appear to them as sources of pleasure. And while we might say that the fact that something appears to a dog as a source of pleasure makes it the case there is a reason for the dog to pursue it, I would hesitate to assert that, for example, a dog's representation of a piece of meat as pleasurable influences its behavior by providing a reason for it to eat it. That representation seems to influence its behavior in some other, presumably causal way, because dogs do not seem to operate in the space of reasons. Operating in the space of reasons requires something more than having representations of things as pleasant or unpleasant; in addition, it requires a capacity for reflection and endorsement that seems to be lacking in dogs.

Whether or not passions are functioning as reasons, since they are not clear and distinct ideas, Descartes thought we are never necessitated to choose in accordance with them. But does the mere fact that we could have chosen otherwise show that we chose freely? As Albritton noted, controlling oneself is a project.¹⁵ If I try to resist a passion and fail in that attempt, even though I might have succeeded, it is far from clear that my resulting choice was free. The very term 'resist' suggests that passions are operating not merely as reasons (if they are operating as reasons), but also as forces with causal power. Moreover, since Descartes thought the first cause of a passion is typically something outside of us or at least outside our mind (II 51), passions would thus appear to be not only forces, but alien forces, or at least the instruments or effects of alien forces, acting on our will. On such an understanding of the passions' influence on the will – that the passions are

¹⁵ Albritton, p. 250.

causal links in chain, originating from something alien, that overpower us – it seems plausible to me to conclude that weakness of will is a case of unfreedom, even if we might have succeeded in resisting those passions.

Let me be clear about what I am asserting here. While there is some evidence that Descartes thought the passions can act on us in such a way as to diminish our freedom of will to the point of unfreedom, I do not think there is conclusive evidence that he thought we are unfree in cases in which we might have succeeded in resisting a passion. But it does seem to me that to the extent that he regarded passions as alien forces that overpower us, he should have drawn that conclusion. The underlying philosophical point, which I take to be consistent with compatibilist conceptions of freedom, is twofold: first, we are unfree if we are forced to do something, even if we are not necessitated to do that thing; and second, the mere fact that we might have succeeded in resisting something that overpowers us does not prevent its being the case that we were forced to do it. The idea here is that we are unfree if overpowered by an alien force to do something, and we can be said to be overpowered even if our failed attempts to resist that force might have been successful.

Aquinas also thought the passions could diminish the freedom of our choices. He argued that evil done through the impulse of passion is less sinful than evil done from reason, because passion diminishes the voluntariness of our action.¹⁶ Passion can diminish the voluntariness of our choices by interfering with our knowledge and reason in three different ways:¹⁷ it can distract us from paying attention to what we know, it can incline us in a way opposite to what we know,¹⁸ and it can interfere with our ability to reason. However, even though Aquinas allowed that in some cases passion destroys our reason completely, so that we no longer have the capacity to choose and have become like animals, he believed that as long as we have some reason, our choices are free.¹⁹ As long as we have some reason, we have control over the passions. One

¹⁶ See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, IaIIae q77 a6.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, IaIIae q77 a2.

¹⁸ I think that what Aquinas meant by this is that a passion can focus our attention on some object to such an extent that our judgment follows our passion, even though we know that we should do otherwise. See IaIIae q77 a1. So the first way reason can be hindered by the passions is that they prevent us from focusing on the right thing; the second way is that they lead us to focus on the wrong thing.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, IaIIae Q77 a7.

way we have control is that we can rid ourselves of the passion by redirecting our attention. More importantly, Aquinas thought that as long as we have some reason we can always prevent the passion from having its full effect. This is possible because we are capable of acting only by means of the consent of reason.

So Aquinas seemed to agree with Descartes that passions can diminish our freedom, but he was clearer in maintaining that so long as we retain our reason and hence our will, we cannot be said to be unfree. The reason he was clearer than Descartes is that he was clearer in maintaining that everything we do as human agents is guided by reason. The passions can hinder reason and even destroy reason, but so long as we have reason, and hence count as human agents, the passions cannot overpower reason. To the extent that Albritton was defending the strong claim that the will is always fully free, and I think that he was going for that strong claim, then this sort of view is not congenial to Albritton. And even to the extent that Albritton was defending the weaker view that the will cannot be rendered unfree, Aquinas's account is not congenial to his.

First, Albritton did not link the will so tightly to reason as did Aquinas. Just as Albritton asserted that 'one can leave the will alone and get excellent results, even now, by manipulating belief instead,'²⁰ I can imagine him saying that tampering with my reason does not amount to tampering with my will. Along these same lines, Albritton differed from both Aquinas and Descartes in his failure to endorse the view that we are fully free only when reason is operating in optimum mode.²¹ In contemporary terms, Aquinas and Descartes both thought that our will is free to the extent that it is reasons-responsive, that is, that our choices are responsive to good reasons. Albritton's account of freedom of will is apparently independent of its being responsive to good reasons. One might well think that in this respect his conception of freedom is superior to that Aquinas and Descartes.

The second point of difference, and this is the main point, is less favorable to Albritton. It seems to me that Aquinas was able to

²⁰ Albritton, p. 242.

²¹ Albritton made even the stronger claim that we might conceivably be at our best when we go against reason, 'There is a kind of contradiction in acting against decisive reason to act otherwise; and if you do it often enough you're impossible. But impossible people, given for example to sarcasms like "Oh can't I? Just watch me," aren't impossible to find. We, of course, aren't like that, except in some of our worst (and, conceivably, some of our best) moments.' *Ibid.*, p. 247.

resist admitting that the passions can render us unfree precisely because he believed that passions cannot act on the will directly, but require the consent of reason. This implies, it seems to me, though this a difficult point, that Aquinas thought the passions operate only as reasons, at least in their capacity to motivate behavior in contrast with their capacity to hinder reason. What is troubling here for Albritton's view is that if we have to view passions as operating as reasons in order to defend the thesis that the will cannot be rendered unfree, then that thesis is in trouble, because Albritton claimed that passions are typically not functioning as reasons. In conceding as he did that it is accurate to describe us as acting from desire or out of fear, Albritton seemed to be conceding that the passions do play a role in influencing our choices. But if the passions influence our choices without operating as reasons for them, there don't seem to me to be many options left to explain their influence. In fact, I can think of only two options. Either they hinder our ability to make good choices or they cause our choices. Both cases are problematic for Albritton's attempt to deploy the notion of weakness of will as part of his strategy to defend the will's absolute freedom. Albritton can deny that our freedom is diminished when our reason is hindered only by maintaining that the will need not be reasons-responsive in order to be fully free. But if tampering with our reason leaves our will intact in the same way Albritton suggested that tampering with our beliefs does, then it seems inappropriate to describe such cases as instances of weakness of will. The second case is also problematic. As outlined above in discussing Descartes, if the passions influence our choices by causing them, then it would seem that there can be scenarios in which the passion is acting as an alien force that is overpowering us, in which case our choice counts as unfree.²² Albritton could try to respond that the notion of us being overpowered in making a choice is incoherent because all alleged instances of alien forces overpowering the will are really cases in which the will is bypassed.²³ But if the will is bypassed, once again it seems inappropriate to describe what is going on as an instance of weakness of will.

The final historical figure I want to discuss is Reid. As I understand Reid, he differed from many historical figures because he

²² I should note that Descartes thought passions, in particular the passion of generosity, can also enhance our ability to make choices (III 153–156).

²³ I am indebted to Dana Nelkin for this point.

thought some animals also have wills. They are capable of acting with an end in view – in other words, they have intentions – even if they are incapable of judgment.²⁴ Reid did, however, deny that their wills are free,²⁵ just as he denied that the wills of young children and madmen are free.²⁶ Freedom for Reid only appears with another power that animals, young children, and madmen lack, which he called liberty or self-government, defined as a power over the determinations of the will.²⁷ This power, which comes in degrees with the development of our intellectual and moral powers,²⁸ enables us to resist passions and other animal motives including appetites, desires and affections which are capable of operating directly on the will without judgment.²⁹

Thus while many philosophers have linked the capacity of reason and judgment to the possession of a will, Reid instead linked the capacity of reason and judgment to the possession of power over the determinations of the will. To a certain extent this is just a verbal difference. What other philosophers have called the will Reid called liberty. But I believe we might learn something by focusing on this verbal difference.

It seems perfectly reasonable to ask, ‘is the will free?’ but it sounds peculiar to ask, ‘is liberty free?’ One wants to say that to have liberty, to have power over our choices, is just what it is to be free. I suspect that what might have been underlying Albritton’s view of the will is the similar thought that to have a will is to have power over our choices, so that to have a will just is to be free. That thought – that to have a will is to be free – gets poorly expressed by saying the will is free.

There are two further noteworthy points of comparison of Albritton’s views with Reid’s. First, in apparent agreement with Albritton and in sharp contrast with Aquinas, Reid believed that the animal motives of appetite and passion operate through the will in a completely different way from rational motives. But Reid’s account of this difference is problematic for Albritton. Reid compared the difference to getting a person to move by pushing him

²⁴ Thomas Reid, *Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind* [1813–1815] (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969), p. 118.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 289.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 298.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 259.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 299.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 200, 289.

and getting a person to move by persuading him.³⁰ That is, Reid seemed to think that the alternative to passions operating through the will as reasons is that they operate as something similar to causal forces. This is problematic for Albritton because once passions and other animal motives are understood to operate on the will as causes it becomes possible for them to overpower rational motives in determining our volitions, in which case, as Reid thought, our liberty would be diminished. The second point of comparison is related. In defending the view that freedom of the will is absolute, Albritton seemed to regard the will as an all or nothing power. That is, if we have a will our choices are up to us and we are free. In contrast Reid thought of liberty as a power that comes in degrees.³¹ So he asserted that 'appetite and passion give an impulse to act and impair liberty, in proportion to their strength.'³²

The primary lesson to be learned then from comparing Albritton's view with those of his illustrious predecessors is this. The only clear way in which passions can operate through the will without diminishing freedom of will is to conceive of them as Aquinas did as operating as reasons for acting. If they operate through the will in some other way than by providing reasons for acting, as Albritton conceded, then it appears that the only way to understand this is as Descartes and Reid did, namely, that they operate as causal forces causing our choices. But then the passions do have the potential to diminish our freedom of will, perhaps even to the point of unfreedom.³³

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³⁰ Ibid., 74.

³¹ Reid, I believe, was committed to the view that someone who was moved by both rational principles of self-interest and duty would have a greater power of liberty or self-government than someone moved by only one or by neither of them, because such a person would be able to resist passions for a wider variety of reasons.

³² Ibid., 75.

³³ Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Rogers Albritton Memorial Conference at UCLA in November, 2002, and at the UCR Agency Workshop in January, 2006. In addition to those people already mentioned in the notes, I am especially grateful to Bonnie Kent, John Carriero, Gideon Yaffe, Gary Watson, Andrews Reath, Casey Hall, and Duane Long.